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THE LAW'S DELAY.
By TALcoTT H. RUSSELL,
OF THE NEW HAVEN BAR.
It is a fact not creditable to the bar or the, courts that while in
every other department of human activity time has been practically
annihilated, scarcely any progress has been made in facilitating
the progress of litigation. If I had wished fifty years ago to com-
municate with a man in Canton, China, it would have taken me
six months to do so and get an answer. I can now do the same
thing in as many hours. I can go personally to London and
transact business and return in three weeks, Fifty years ago I
could not have done the same thing in as many months. But if I
have a controversy with my next door neighbor involving $i,ooo
and he is disposed to make use of all his legal weapons of defense
and delay, I am very fortunate if it is disposed of in a year, while
two, three and four years are not uncommon periods for the dura-
tion of a hotly contested litigation.
This condition of affairs is not only theoretically wrong, but a
cause of endless trouble to the community and to the bar itself.
The ordinary man looks upon a litigation as a calamity little short
in its disastrous consequence of a serious conflagration. He will
sacrifice his just rights to an almost unlimited extent rather than
resort to the courts, because he believes that although he may
theoretically obtain justice it will be at the expense of such delay,
worriment and vexation as to be no justice at all..
For instance, during the heat of a campaign -some newspaper
willfully and maliciously charges a candidate with giving utter-
ance to some atrocious sentiment which makes him an object of
contempt to all sensible voters. There ought to be for such a
man some adequate redress. But as a matter of fact there is
none. No lawyer can advise him that he can get such a case to
trial in less than a year with any certainty. And yet the law is
well settled and the facts and the evidence all easily obtained.
But the injured party can get no redress and a conscientious law-
yer will so advise his client. If he brings a suit the scandal simply
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grows. A judgment for damages a year after the elections are
ended is of no value as a means of redress, for what the libelled
person requires is a vindication before the public. A verdict for
a paltry sum long after the matter has been forgotten is no remedy
at all.
If a man in active business whose time is valuable has a cause
of action against another for a thousand dollars it will frequently
cost him more in the end than it is worth to get it, and that not
because the case is difficult or the charges of his lawyer excessive,
for lawyer's charges are not generally excessive, competition hav-
ing affected them as well as every other class, but on account of
the delay and uncertainty of trial which will consume his time and
interfere with all his engagements. Now there ought to be noth-
ing terrible to the citizen in the resort to an intelligent tribunal
for the adjustment of an ordinary controversy. I propose to
inquire briefly into the causes of this condition and whether such
causes cannot be, to some extent at least, removed.
Some of these causes are such as are founded on the nature of
things, and are therefore unavoidable. To one who considers the
various contingencies which may occur it will not seem strange
that delays and postponements should frequently be necessary.
Reflect for a moment how many persons are concerned in an ordi-
nary jury trial. The judge, the twelve jurors, the two parties,
and say six material witnesses. All these must be present at the
time of trial, and in a physical and mental condition to discharge
their duties. And further, considerations of humanity must have
their due weight. The judge who insisted upon detaining any
one of these individuals and compelling him to perform his duties
immediately after the death or during the critical illness of a wife
or child would be charged with inhumanity ; so that the progress
of the suit depends to some extent on the condition of the families
of each one of the persons actually concerned.
But it is not with these that I propose to occupy myself. We
cannot change nature or abolish death by statute. There are
other causes of delay which are avoidable, and with these I shall
deal.
They may be divided into two classes, i. e., those which arise
out of the condition of the law, and those which arise out of its
administration, using the term law in its broader sense, as includ-
ing not only statutes and decisions but the established rules of the
court. In discussing the subject, I shall use illustrations largely
drawn from the practice in the State of Connecticut, because I am
more familiar with that practice.
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The first subject upon which a writer upon this topic naturally
falls, is that of trial by jury. I shall not attempt to discuss the
question whether the conclusions of jurors or of courts are more
certain or more reliable. Most lawyers of experience would find
some difficulty in stating from which source they had received
the greater surprises in the matter of decisions. Whatever may
be said in regard to this point, it must be admitted that the jury
system adds immensely to the expense and delay of litigation.
However, jury trial is too large and too hackneyed a subject
for treatment in this article, and the institution is so firmly rooted
in our system that only a constitutional change can remove it. It
is, however, perfectly feasible to hedge about jury trial with
restrictions which will greatly diminish the delays incident to it.
In this State we have adopted the practice of trying all cases in
the court unless specially claimed for the jury. But the law allows
parties to claim such cases within the first term, or after in case
issue is joined after the first term. This was not so bad under the
old system of short terms, but since the new system in the Superior
Court it' enables a litigant to conceal his plans for a period, and
by claiming a jury just before the case is reached for trial throw
the case over possibly for a year, as it may easily happen that such
a course may be taken at a time when no jury will be in session
during the remainder of the year. There could be no possible
objection, either constitutional or practical, to requiring a litigant
to claim a jury, if he intends to do so, within a short period, say
ten days, of the return of the process to court. There would be
no hardship in requiring him to make up his mind within this
time. In practice he generally knows when he commences his
action or is served with notice of a suit whether he desires a jury
trial or not. In cases where he makes up his mind at a later
period the claim for a jury trial is generally made to secure delay,
and no expedient is more commonly resorted to for this purpose.
On the other hand, it is a common practice for corporation
lawyers to suffer a default just before the case is reached for trial
before a jury, which under our anomalous practice carries the
case away from the jury, for a hearing in damages, to the court,
and may cause a delay of months. An attempt was made to rem-
edy this evil by chapter x57 of the Laws of 1889, providing: "In
every action of tort in which the defendant suffers a default and
there is a hearing in damages, said hearing in damages shall be to
the jury unless the defaulting defendant shall have given notice of
his intention to suffer such default to the clerk of the court in
which such action is pending within thirty days after the time
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fixed by law for closing the pleadings in such action shall have
expired." But this statute is of doubtful efficacy and can possibly
be evaded by the interposition of a demurrer. There can be no
reason *hy the hearing in damages should not take place before
the jury in all cases where a jury was claimed by either party
unless the defendant should suffer a default within ten days after
the return of the case to court. There could be no question about
the meaning of such a provision.
Another obstacle to the progress of suits is the excessively long
time allowed in Connecticut to prepare pleadings. Rule 4, Sec. i,
provides:
"SECTION I. In every civil action in the Superior Court, Court of Com-
mon Pleas, and District Court, the defendant, if he does not plead in abatement,
shall answer or demur within thirty days from the return day of the writ, and
thereafter the pleadings in the action shall advance at least one step, at the
expiration of each successive period of twenty days, until the same shall be
closed."
Now thirty days is an absurdly long time for the preparation
of an answer in an ordinary case. In three-quarters of the cases
such a plea is so simple that it can be prepared in an hour. The
only effect of the long periods allowed is that lawyers put off the
consideration of the matter, and then forget about it. Lax as the
rule is, it is never enforced. Such a thing as a default for the lack
of a plea is scarcely heard of, and no penalty, not even nominal
costs, is exacted for a breach of the rule.
The time for pleading should be shortened to two weeks.
Such an allowance would be more than ample to prepare plead-
ings in the vast majority of cases. In special cases where more
time was required, it could be granted on application to the court,
but such cases would be very few indeed.
Furthermore, the time for filing the plea should date from
the service of the process, provided that a plea might be filed on
or before the third opening of the court, and process itself should
be made returnable on any Tuesday in the month and not solely
on the first Tuesday as at present. There is absolutely no reason
why a defendant should not commence the preparation of his
answer as soon as he receives notice of suit and a copy of the
complaint.
This rule of pleading should in all cases be enforced except
when special circumstances were shown requiring delay. In all
other cases costs should be exacted as a condition of pleading after
the time fixed by the rule.
The effect of the present system can be best studied by follow-
ing out an imaginary case brought to the Superior Court, we will
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say, in the long vacation in July or August, and returnable in
September. The thirty days rule requires a pleading about Octo-
ber ist, that is to say, the defendant has three months to prepare
an answer, which in most cases is a general denial in perhaps
twenty words, requiring as many minutes for its preparation.
But this is not all. A dilatory counsel, and in fact most
lawyers, pay no attention to this rule, and there is no reason
why they should, because there is no penalty for neglect. The
plaintiff must then move for an answer. Such a motion must
go on the short calendar, necessarily requiring a delay of another
week. If the defendant can suggest no excuse to put the motion
over, which he almost always can, unless his lawyer has an
unusually barren imagination, he is ordered to file his answer some
time during the following week. The case has now been carried
over to the middle of November. As the rules provide that no
case shall be put on the trial list until after the pleadings are
closed we have this result, that a plaintiff cannot even claim his
case for trial until four months and a half after it is commenced.
The case then takes its place at the foot of the trial list. As bus-
iness has then fully commenced it is almost certain to be carried
over to the following January, when it only fairly commences to
take its chances of trial. The case will practically fare no better,
for obvious reasons, as regards delay, if brought in April or May.
Nor is this result due to any excessive pressure of work upon
the courts. On the contrary, nothing is more common than
threats from the judges to adjourn court unless cases are brought
forward for trial.
Another cause of infinite delay, is the abuse of the power of
amendment and change of plea, as well as of demurrers and dila-
tory motions to strike out or make more specific, etc. The right
of amendment and change of pleading is a beneficial one, but the
practice has become so lax in this respect that lawyers have no
longer any motive for accurate pleading, and papers are drawn
with an utter disregard of form. Before the practice act it was,
I believe, the general rule to exact costs as a condition of amend-
ment, and that too when the costs, owing to the exaction of attend-
ance fees of twenty-five cents for every court day, were much
heavier than they now are.
The Statute, R. S., Sec. 3720, in specifying the fees allowed
to parties in civil actions, uses the following language: "for the
trial of an issue of law or fact, fifteen dollars, and if more than
one issue of fact shall be tried at one time only one trial fee shall,
be allowed."
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Now no language could apparently be more plain. It is
obviously the intent of the Legislature that issues of law or fact
in a case separately tried should be separately taxed. If there
could be any doubt as to the meaning of the language of the first
part of the clause the last portion would fix it beyond question.
If it were intended that but one fee should be taxed for all issues
of law or fact tried, why should it be provided that issues of fact
tried at the same time should carry only one fee.
And yet, under this statute it has become the established rule
of the courts that there can be but one issue of law in any case,
i. e., if an answer is interposed, to which a demurrer is filed and
the demurrer sustained on argument, and thereupon a new answer
interposed and another demurrer successfully interposed at another
term of the court, but one fee can be taxed.
A plainer case of judicial legislation it is difficult to imagine.
It apparently controverts both the language and the reason of the
statute. The statute was intended to indemnify the parties to
some extent for the expense of litigation. Each trial of successive
issues involves expense of counsel fees, etc., to one of the parties.
This ruling has been severely criticised by some of the judges,
but is too well established to be questioned.
Another singular ruling has been made by the courts in regard
to a different clause of the same statute, which provides as fol-
lows: "In difficult or extraordinary cases in the Superior Court,
where a defense has been interposed, said court may also in its
discretion make a further allowance to the prevailing party of a
sum not exceeding one hundred dollars. '" Though this statute has
been on the statute book for eight or ten years, no case has ever
occurred of sufficient difficulty in the opinion of the courts to call
for its application.
There can be no doubt that a large part of the delay in the
progress of litigation in this State has resulted from the construc-
tion of the statutes in regard to costs. Had the rule been adopted
that every motion or separate pleading calling for a distinct or
separate hearing should entail upon the defeated party the pay-
ment of ten or fifteen dollar costs, the innumerable motions and
demurrers which occupy the short calendar would be diminished
at least one-half, and the disposal of lawsuits correspondingly
facilitated. Such motions and demurrers are frequently inter-
posed without any excuse and solely with a view to delay, and this
is done under the present system with absolute impunity. Counsel
would hesitate before exposing his, client ta an expense of fifteen,
dollars for such an end.
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The construction adopted of the rules in regard to costs is
undoubtedly responsible for a large part of the delay in litigation.
Certainly that cause, together with the unnecessary amount of
time allowed for pleadings and the failure of the courts to enforce
such rules as exist, is very largely to blame.
Another avoidable cause of delay is the practice of continuing
causes on account of the absence or inability to attend of material
witnesses. It is perfectly apparent that in the hands of an
unscrupulous party there is no limit to the extent of delay which
can be obtained by this excuse. The law allows the taking of a
deposition when the proposed witness lives more than twenty
miles from the place of trial, is out of the State, or by age or
infirmity is unable to travel to court, or is going to sea. The prac-
tice is general to grant a continuance on account of the absence of
a material witness, even when under the rules the party might
take the deposition of the witness. It seems to me this, in the
majority of cases, is wrong, and that the party who relies on the
testimony of a witness out of the State or likely to be absent at
the time of trial should be obliged to take the deposition of the
witness, have him present at the time of trial, or lose his testi-
mony. The plea often made that the actual presence of witnesses
is necessary to the trial of a case does not seem to me to justify
the continuance of cases where a deposition could be taken.
A class of cases involving the most important and difficult
questions of fact and enormous sums of money is tried in the
United States under the patent laws entirely on written testimony,
and no complaint has been made that this practice has resulted in
any greater amount of mistake or uncertainty than the ordinary
methods of trial.
But nothing is more common than the continuance of cases for
successive periods amounting in all to years, because for some rea-
son which the party could have anticipated, he himself, or a witness
who perhaps resides in a remote State, cannot be present. Sea-
faring men, for instance, who spend three-quarters of their time
on the high seas, should not be allowed to secure the indefinite
continuance of the cases and make the courts and the opposing
parties dependent on the tides and the winds.
But after every allowance has been made for causes mentioned,
it must still be confessed that the blame for the delay of justice
lies mainly with the bar and with the court, so far as they yield to
the pleas of counsel based upon their unreadiness or inability to
dispose of their cases. And yet this cause is one which should
have the least possible weight. There is some plausibility in the
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claim that the personal presence of parties or witnesses is nec-
essary, but in a community where there is no lack of intelligent
lawyers it cannot be claimed that the presence of any particular
counsel is essential to the trial of a case. Theoretically, only the
actual engagement of counsel in the trial of a case in court is
acceptable as a plea for continuance, but in practice every possible
excuse is accepted, down even to the absence of counsel in attend-
ance on an important consultation, or the necessity of preparation
for some other case.
There are two classes of lawyers who are always demanding
delay. First, those whose natural indolence resents any demand
for action as a personal injury ; second, the excessively busy ones
who have managed to get under their control more cases than
their time and strength will enable them to dispose of, and who
remind one continually of a hen trying to hatch out more eggs
than she can cover.
No consideration should be given to the first class, and as to
the second, they should not be allowed to obstruct the progress of
justice in order that they may hold cases which they should not
have accepted, with the knowledge that their engagements would
not allow them to dispose of them within a reasonable time. A
due regard for the interests of justice and the rights of his fellow
members of the bar make it the duty of a lawyer who finds himself
in such a situation to throw off a portion of his burdens, exercis-
ing a selection as to the quality of his cases, and leaving the less
desirable cases for the younger or less fortunate members. An
attempt on the part of one person to engross an undue share of
practice and make the courts and other members sacrifice them-
selves to wait his convenience should receive scant consideration
from the bar or the courts.
The recent experience of the State of Connecticut in connec-
tion with our political imbroglio has furnished an excellent
example of the practical impossibility of disposing of legal bus-
iness in the courts. One set of persons became entitled to the
State offices in January, 189o. The courts did not determine who
they were until by lapse of time the question ceased to be of prac-
tical consequence, the terms of office having nearly expired. As a
consequence of this every department of government was obstruc-
ted. There was practically no legislature, and the machinery of
justice was delayed in other cases. Only the moderation and good
sense of the people saved us from public disorder. And yet the cases
involving these questions were of such overwhelming importance
that they were recognized as having the right of way over every
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other controversy. The courts in this instance failed utterly to
accomplish the end for which they were established. If such a
failure of justice occurs in a case of such overwhelming importance
what hope is there for a mere private litigant to receive prompt
justice? The result points to something wrong in the system of
administration.
In this article I have attempted to point out some of the evils
of the present system. The first two, namely, the system of
pleadings and the failure of the courts to restrict dilatory motions
and proceedings by the assessment of costs or otherwise, can be
remedied by appropriate legislation, or possibly by the adoption
of more adequate rules. These evils are perhaps peculiar to
Connecticut, while the others referred to are more universal. The
second evil, the continuing of cases on account of the absence of
parties or witnesses when their depositions can be procured, it is
comparatively easy to deal with by a stringent rule of court such
as I have indicated in this article.
The last obstacle is the most difficult one. As senatorial
courtesy sometimes renders national legislation impossible, so
professional courtesy or the abuse of it results in such a delay as
amounts almost to denial of justice. Yet not until the courts or
bar become strong enough to restrain its abuse will the courts be
enabled to discharge their duties with reasonable dispatch.
The gubernatorial controversy already referred to suffered
from having too many eminent counsel and too much professional
courtesy. I am led by the fate of this case to suggest that possi-
bly it would not be too severe a rule that where there were several
counsel on a side, any one of them competent to the trial
of a case, it should not be continued or postponed on account
of the professional engagements or convenience of one.
The subject is, as I have said, a very difficult one to deal with.
But it must be dealt with vigorously if the courts are ever to accom-
plish their duties with dispatch. The only completely adequate
remedy would be the adoption of a rule that any lawyer bringing
a suit or accepting a retainer to defend one should be prepared to
try the case when it comes up, or get some one else to do so. In
either case he should commence the preparation of the case at
once. As it is, the last thing a lawyer ever thinks of is the prep-
aration of a case. It would be idle for him to do so at an early
period. It will generally be so long before he gets a chance to
try it that the information he gets will be forgotten and his labor
lost. So he pigeon-holes the papers and thinks no more about the
matter until his attention is called to it by a demand for some
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pleading, or the case is called for assignment. He then begins to
look about for witnesses and evidence, only to find that evidence
which he could have easily obtained in the first place and which
should have been embodied in a deposition, has passed beyond his
reach. He thereupon states that fact to the court, and the case is
continued to some indefinite future period. Let the rule once be
established that cases must be disposed of when assigned without
regard to the convenience or engagement of counsel, and must be
assigned and tried within a certain short perio 1 unless some extra-
ordinary cause can be shown rendering the trial impossible, and
the result would be different. Such a rule would in the end be a
Telief to the bar itself. I think a large part of every lawyer's
time, perhaps the larger part, is consumed in the preparation for
trials which for some reason do not come off at the time appointed,
so that the labor of preparation is lost and has to be done over
again. If the stringent rule I have suggested were adopted busi-
ness would be so arranged that there would be a reasonable cer-
tainty of trial at the times appointed. And business would be so
distributed that cases would not interfere with one another. Thus
the convenience of the bar as well as of litigants would be in the
end promoted.
I believe it to be entirely possible, without any increase in the
existing judicial force, by insisting on proper changes in the rules
and the rigid enforcement of such rules, that the great majority of
litigated cases could be disposed of in sixty days in the court of
first resort, and thirty days thereafter in case of appeal, and that
six months should be an entirely exceptional period for the dura-
tion of a cause. Such changes, in my opinion, would not increase
but would lighten the labors of the bar and bench. Until such a
result is accomplished the administration of justice will be behind
the age.
And yet I am well aware that these ideas would be regarded
-by many, perhaps most, lawyers, as wildly Utopian. Any one
who attempts to interfere with the legal traditions of leisure
.and deliberation is apt to be regarded as a disturber of the
peace. Both the bar and the courts are too apt to think that
Accurate results are more apt to be reached by delay and delibera-
tion. I believe in many cases the contrary is true. Courts which
decide cases immediately after full argument by trained counsel,
while the impressions of the case and of the discussion are fresh
in their minds, are more apt to reach sound conclusions than those
which hold cases undecided until the impressions of the case have
become indistinct. I have a distinct recollection of one case, an
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example I believe of many others, where the court after holding
a case, ostensibly tnder advisement, for a period of five months,
rendered a decision leaving out an item of four or five thousand
dollars to which the plaintiff was plainly entitled, and had to cor-
rect its decision in that particular; a mistake which could not pos-
sibly have happened had the decision been rendered immediately
on the close of the argument, or even after a fresh inspection of
the record in the case. In this case, as in many others, delibera-
tion had resulted in oblivion.
